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Note 
 
AquAdvantage is Not Real Advantage: European 
Biotechnology Regulations and the United States’ 
September 2010 FDA Review of Genetically 
Modified Salmon 
Katherine Wilinska* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have brought an increase in public concern over 
genetically modified (GM) organisms and their possible impact on the 
health and safety of consumers and the environment. GM food supporters 
revere the enhanced quality and taste, increased yield, lower production 
costs, heightened pest and drought resistance, and shorter production times 
of transgenic foods. However, opponents fear the yet unknown 
environmental, social, health, and ethical risks that these foods bring with 
them.1 The divided views are, to different extents, reflected in the 
divergent regulation of GM foods in the United States and the European 
Union.2 
 
*  Katherine Wilinska holds an MA in English from A. Mickiewicz University in Poland 
and is expected to graduate with a JD from the University of Minnesota Law School in 
December 2011. She has spent her last semester of law school studying European Union 
law at the Bocconi University in Milan, Italy. In the past she has worked as a manager for 
an international business and as a Polish interpreter. Her areas of research include corporate 
law, antitrust law, biotechnology regulation, and international business and trade law with a 
special focus on cross-comparison of United States and European Union law. 
 1. See MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 34–38 
(2009) (listing such positives to GM organisms’ development as the prevention of hunger 
in developing countries, the clean-up of toxic spills, and the elimination of toxic chemicals 
from crop production; whereas some negatives include the impairment of biodiversity, 
irreversible changes to the natural food chain, the triggering of allergenic reactions, and even 
a monopoly of modified products concentrated in a few corporate hands); Simonetta Zarilli, 
International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral Legal 
Frameworks, at 1–2, UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/30, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.41 (2005) 
(contrasting the benefits of GM foods in resolving issues such as the nutritional needs of the 
world’s growing population and the efficient use of agrarian space with possible negative 
impacts on human health and the environment). 
 2. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 7 (“In both the US and the EU [the 
differences in the regulations] remain unchanged in their fundamental approaches.”). 
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September 2010 brought a new wave of public debate when the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) held hearings on the possible 
approval of a genetically modified fish, AquAdvantage Salmon (AAS), for 
public consumption.3 Aqua Bounty Technologies, Inc. (ABT) maintains 
that the product is safe for consumption and poses little environmental risk, 
but consumer and environmental groups disagree and point out the lack of 
effective risk assessment methods with respect to GM animals, as no other 
such animal has been approved for human consumption.4 While the 
controversy centers around the review’s precedential value,5 the unknown 
health risks, and a serious environmental concern if AAS escape into the 
wild,6 there is also a more complex impact on the U.S.-E.U. salmon trade 
and international laws because ABT intends to sell AAS eggs 
commercially to farmers.7 
This Note will examine the possible consequences of FDA approval 
of AAS for mass consumption. Part II will discuss the ABT application 
packet (the Packet), the social perception and regulation of GM foods in 
both the United States and the European Union, and relevant international 
agreements. Part III will analyze AAS environmental assessment, the 
review’s possible impact on international trade and international laws, and 
the sufficiency of ABT research. It will propose trade-friendly legislative 
solutions, uniform labeling within a new statutory regime, and stricter 
research requirements in the submission process. Overall, this Note argues 
that relevant congressional action is overdue, and the FDA should not 
approve AAS at this time. American GM foods’ marketability in the 
international trade arena requires new laws consistent with the labeling, 
tracing, and monitoring requirements of other nations in order to protect 
the environment and maintain overall consumer trust.  
 
 3. Lyndsey Layton, FDA Hears Concerns over Approving Genetically Modified 
Salmon, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/20/AR2010092005967.html (reporting that Aqua Bounty 
Technologies, Inc., a company that spent the last fifteen years developing superior qualities 
in Atlantic salmon, is now seeking a green light to start massive production of the fish for 
sale to the public). 
 4. See Kim Geiger, Genetically Modified Salmon Safe to Eat, FDA Report Says, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/04/nation/la-na-fda-salmon-
20100904-15; 
Susan Heavey, Biotech Salmon Faces Scrutiny at FDA Panel, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/20/us-fda-biotech-salmon-
idUSTRE68J0EZ20100920 (discussing the rising public concern about GM salmon safety). 
 5. Other GM animals await similar approvals including environmentally friendly 
manure producing pigs and mad cow disease resistant cattle. If and when the FDA approves 
AAS, such companies will proceed with their approval petitions. ABT itself hopes to 
approve its own GM tilapia and trout in the future. See Heavey, supra note 4. 
 6. PETER COATES, SALMON 104 (2006) (explaining that wild salmon populations 
would be negatively affected by any genetically superior species). 
 7. See Heavey, supra note 4; Geiger, supra note 4. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
GM organisms have been genetically altered8 to obtain certain 
desirable traits, such as drought resistance in plants and virus resistance or 
accelerated growth in animals.9 In the United States, the FDA, which has 
statutory and regulatory authority over genetically modified foods,10 
defines GM animals as animals altered by recombinant DNA (rDNA).11 In 
addition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provide oversight for GM crop 
planting and its impact on the environment and food safety.12 The three 
agencies constitute the Coordinated Framework13 responsible for 
regulation and oversight of GM plants and animals. 
European legislation defines a genetically modified organism as “one 
in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur 
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.”14 In Europe, GM-
related regulation is not effectuated by governmental agencies; instead, it 
arises from the interaction between E.U. government bodies such as the 
 
 8. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 9 (defining genetic engineering as a 
process in which genes from one organism are isolated, manipulated in a laboratory and 
injected into another organism). 
 9. See What are Genetically Modified (GM) Foods?, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
INFORMATION (last updated Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/gmfood.shtml (listing other 
possible names for living organisms whose genetic traits have been modified to obtain 
desirable traits such as “genetically modified,” “genetically engineered,” or “transgenic”). 
 10. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that agencies regulate GM 
plants in terms of the final products’ characteristics—not in terms of the production process). 
 11. See CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS CONTAINING 
HERITABLE RECOMBINANT DNA CONSTRUCTS 3 (2009) [hereinafter REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS] available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guid
anceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf (defining genetically modified or engineered animals as 
those whose DNA has been injected with parts of DNA from another animal which 
possessed certain desirable traits like resistance to viruses or cold temperatures, thus 
producing a “recombinant DNA”). 
 12. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10.  
 13. See generally Margaret Rosso Grossman, Genetically Modified Crops and Food 
in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State measures, and Liability in 
Tort, in THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE 
APPROACHES 299, 300 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 2010); POLLACK & 
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 46; Antonia Eliason, Science versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: 
The (Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific Process and the (In)Sufficiency of Scientific 
Evidence in EC-Biotech, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 341, 370 (2009); Valery Federici, 
Note, Genetically Modified Food and Informed Consumer Choice: Comparing U.S. and 
E.U. Labeling Laws, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 515, 538 (2010); David E. Sella-Villa, Gently 
Modified Operations: How Environmental Concerns Addressed Through Customs 
Procedures Can Successfully Resolve the US-EU GMO Dispute, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL 
L. & POL’Y REV. 971 (2009). 
 14. Council Directive 2001/18, art. 2(2), 2001 O.J. (L 160) 4 (EC). 
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European Commission, European Parliament, and relevant authorities in 
each of the member states.15 Those bodies are collectively referred to as 
the Community Framework.16 
AAS falls under both the U.S. and E.U. GM definitions. Its genetic 
code has been altered by injecting the Chinook salmon growth hormone, 
which promotes growth by stimulating the thyroid, and the ocean pout 
antifreeze protein, which enables the salmon to survive in near freezing 
temperatures.17 The FDA is reviewing AAS under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act18 (FFDCA) and its New Animal Drug Application19 
(NADA) as a “new animal drug” intended for use in animals20 in 
accordance with its 2009 Guidance for Industry 187, created to streamline 
the GM animal application process.21 NADA triggers environmental 
analysis under the Code of Federal Regulations Title 21,22 the 
environmental impact statement (EIS),23 and the FDA examination of 
environmental impacts of GM animals24 including inadvertent release or 
escape. 
A.  ABT’S APPLICATION PACKET, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, AND 
WEBSITE 
The Packet submitted for FDA review to the Center for Veterinary 
Medicine (CVM) contains publicly accessible information on the AAS 
health and environmental risk assessment.25 The submission is a result of 
fourteen year research and sixty million dollar development efforts by 
ABT.26 ABT plans to produce eggs in its facilities in Canada, to grow-out 
 
 15. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10. 
 16. Id. at 60. 
 17. VETERINARY MEDICINE ADVISORY COMM., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR 
VETERINARY MED., BRIEFING PACKET: AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 65 (2010) 
[hereinafter THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMater
ials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf. 
 18. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006). 
 19. Id. § 512, 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1). 
 20. Id. § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(v). 
 21. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11.  
 22. 21 C.F.R. § 25 (2011) (requiring an environmental impact statement (EIS) in 
extraordinary circumstances under § 25.21 when there is a potential for serious harm to the 
environment and the action adversely affects endangered species). 
 23. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 19, 
25 (requiring an EIS until the FDA has more experience in processing applications for GM 
animals). 
 24. Id. at 12. 
 25. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17.  
 26. Geiger, supra note 4. 
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the fish in Panama,27 and to license AAS eggs to fish farmers.28 In 
assessing the risks, ABT used 144 market-sized salmon to measure their 
food safety.29 The report states that AAS contains ocean pout antifreeze 
protein to increase resistance to freezing temperatures and Chinook salmon 
growth hormone to promote growth and increased levels of allergens.30 
AAS grows several times bigger than and twice as fast as wild salmon and 
the Packet claims that “adequate containment measures appear to be in 
place” to insure a “low probability of escape.”31 Nevertheless, the 
possibility of escape does exist because “no single containment measure 
can be assured to be 100% effective.”32 Furthermore, despite AAS’s 
“extremely small” survival likelihood,33 subsistence is possible because 
“up to 5%” of females are not sterile.34 In light of data insufficiency, ABT 
“conservatively assumed that older life stages . . . would survive if they 
escape containment” but that “there are no likely consequences on the 
U.S., foreign nations not participating in the action, or on the global 
commons as a result of applicable reproductive and 
geographic/geophysical confinement.”35  
ABT submitted a separate Environmental Assessment (EA) to the 
CVM36 pursuant to NADA’s requirement of showing that the “new animal 
drug” is safe and effective for its intended use.37 The EA states that the 
AAS trans-gene will not mutate into unknown forms,38 even though wild 
salmon undergo genetic change in response to different environmental 
conditions.39 Further, research shows that at an escape rate of 1%, 
traditional farm-raised salmon escapees interbreed with wild salmon, 
compete for food, and disrupt the ecosystem.40 However, AAS will be 
farmed in land based facilities with redundant containment measures.41 
 
 27. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65. 
 28. See Heavey, supra note 4; Geiger, supra note 4; AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES 
INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 41 (Aug. 25, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Veteri
naryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224760.pdf. 
 29. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 86. 
 30. Id. at 65, 75. 
 31. Id. at 131. 
 32. Id. at 116. 
 33. Id. at 116, 130. 
 34. Id. at 115, 127.  
 35. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 130.  
 36. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28.  
 37. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 13; 
see also AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 14 (informing that NADA 
approval triggers environmental assessment). 
 38. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 19. 
 39. Id. at 21. 
 40. Id. at 30. 
 41. Id. at 43, 54. 
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These will be in areas where no natural disasters have occurred.42 At the 
same time, relevant research on salmon shows that a mere 25% size 
advantage is enough to push smaller fish away from feeding and mating 
grounds.43 Thus, one can presume that AAS, which has a significant size 
advantage over its natural cousin, could decimate the natural salmon 
population. 
The ABT’s website assures the public that AAS has no mating 
advantage, would not alter native salmon populations, is 100% sterile, and 
has undergone adequate environmental assessment.44 Further, no 
antifreeze or growth hormones will be passed on to the consumers, 
adequate federal laws are in place, and the FDA has sufficient expertise to 
approve the transgenic fish.45 
The FDA accepted public comments on the approval until November 
22, 2010.46 At the time of this publication, the FDA has not issued a 
conclusive decision, but Congress voted in June 2011 to prohibit the FDA 
from approving GM salmon.47 The general concerns were a hasty approval 
process and insufficient review of impact on the health of American 
consumers and the environment. 
B.  GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, genetically modified foods have enjoyed greater 
consumer tolerance, a more lenient regulatory framework, and easier 
approval process due to an assumption that the new genetic varieties are 
not harmful unless evidence indicates the contrary.  
1.  Consumer Tolerance of Genetic Modification 
 American consumers have historically been more tolerant of GM 
foods and have not demanded harsher laws regulating their proliferation 
 
 42. Id. at 53. 
 43. Id. at 35. 
 44. See Frequently Asked Questions, AQUABOUNTY.COM, 
http://www.aquabounty.com/technology/faq-297.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2011) (“Q. Can 
we be sure that AAS will really be sterile? A. Yes”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. FDA to Convene Public Hearing on the Labeling of Food Made from 
AquAdvantage Salmon, FDA (Aug. 25, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUpdates/ucm222601.htm. 
 47.  Press Release, Center for Food Safety, U.S. House of Representatives Passes 
Amendment to Prohibit Genetically Engineered Salmon Approval (June 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/06/16/u-s-house-of-representatives-
passes-amendment-to-prohibit-genetically-engineered-salmon-approval/ (providing that in 
the H.R. 2112, Agriculture, Rural, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2012, the House of Representatives asserted its discretionary budget 
authority). 
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on the market,48 although that position appears to be changing.49 The 
United States began its biotechnological developments with caution. 
However, a more liberal approach has evolved regarding the use of genetic 
modifications for enhancement50 with an active engagement in promotion 
since the 1970s. In 1999, upwards of 60% of grocery store foods were 
grown from genetically modified seeds, a fact of which only 33% of 
Americans were aware.51 By 2007, approximately 89% of soybeans and 
61% of corn grown in the United States had been genetically modified.52  
Yet, recent trends illustrate that when American consumers are asked 
directly if they would like to know whether their food is genetically 
modified, 94% say yes.53 There is also growing pressure for change in the 
regulation of GM foods, which is manifested by commercial adaptation, 
political mobilization, and policy change.54 Combining the ubiquity of 
genetic modification and the growing desire of public opinion that 
modified food be labeled before it can be sold; it is somewhat surprising 
that approval of new GM foods for production in the United States is 
relatively simple. 
 
2.  The Equivalence Principle: Safe until Proven Otherwise 
The U.S. approval system operates in accordance with a risk-based 
outlook: the equivalence principle.55 This principle allows approval of new 
 
 48. See Heavey, supra note 4; Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell, Genetically 
Modified Organisms and the Public: Participation, Preferences, and Protest, in THE 
REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES, 
supra note 13, at 11, 23. 
 49. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 23. 
 50. Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the 
United States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 5, 2001), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8688/regulation_of_gmos_in_europe_and_the_united_state
s.html.  
 51. Id.; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 266–67 (revealing that most 
recent polls indicate a number as low as 26%); Grossman, supra note 13, at 299. 
 52. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 1 (listing other GM foods such as canola, 
potatoes, tomatoes, papaya, squash and sunflowers). 
 53. Federici attributes the desire for labels as a result of the popular fear of the 
unknown and points out that most consumers are “against eating GM food despite 
inadvertently having already made it part of their daily diets.” Federici, supra note 13, at 
522; see also Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 12 (revealing that a majority would 
appear unhappy with Government policy that consisted of not labeling GM products). 
 54. While commercial adaptation results from the voluntary compliance of the United 
States with E.U. regulations to gain access to E.U. markets, political mobilization results 
from consumer interest groups advocating for stronger regulations. Yet further policy 
change results from the United States protecting both the market and its consumers. See 
POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 25–26.   
 55. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 300; POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 50; 
Franz Xaver Perrez, Risk Regulation, Precaution and Trade, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND 
THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM 246, 251 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas 
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products that are substantially equivalent to natural ones in the absence of 
significant adverse effects on production and consumption.56 This 
approach is meant to ensure “easy and reliable access to foreign markets 
for their biotechnology exports.”57 In other words, the introduction of GM 
foods, which are considered equivalent to their natural counterparts, into 
the U.S. food industry, is governed by free market principles. In light of 
the equivalence concept, the U.S. legislature puts complete trust in 
scientific research and delegates approval tasks to government agencies 
that safeguard public health and the environment under the Coordinated 
Framework.58 In spite of the presumed equivalence approach, and in 
response to growing consumer demands, the FDA has recently released 
guidelines on voluntary labeling of GM products.59 Although AAS’s EA 
mentions labeling for transport from Canada to Panama,60 and the Packet 
mentions containment requirement labels,61 there is no note of actual 
consumer product labeling once AAS reaches market shelves. However, 
the FDA could exercise its discretion to require such labels under the 
Guidance for Industry.62 
3.  Less Restrictive Laws 
In general, the United States has less pronounced federal legislation 
on GM foods than the European Union63 and does not require its regulatory 
 
Cottier eds., 2008); Eliason, supra note 13, at 349, 365; Federici, supra note 13, at 534–36; 
Melissa Ince & Meredith Mariani, The EU, the United States, and the GMO Dispute: Ten 
Years and Counting, AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (A.B.A. Section of Env’t, Energy, 
and Res.), Apr. 2008, at 15, 16; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 971; Debra M. Strauss, Feast 
or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in 
the E.U. Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 780, 784 (2008); Zarilli, 
supra note 1, at 4. 
 56. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 46 (explaining that substantially 
equivalent products are those which are “not inherently risky” and may be regulated under 
existing statutes); see also Bernd van der Meulen, Regulating GM Food: Three Levels, 
Three Issues, in THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 139, 153 (Han 
Somsen ed., 2007) (revealing that the U.S. approach looks at the absence of risk and that 
European authorities weren’t able to refute the evidence presented by the United States that 
there were no risks). 
 57. See Zarilli, supra note 1, at 45. 
 58. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 17; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 972–73. 
 59. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 50, 268; Grossman, supra note 13, at 
317 (“Because consumers may be interested in whether food has been genetically modified, 
the agency developed a guidance to help industry ensure that voluntary labeling is truthful 
and does not mislead consumers.”). 
 60. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 48. 
 61. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 47. 
 62. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 7 
(“[I]n certain circumstances . . . we intend to exercise enforcement discretion . . . .”); id. at 
15 (recommending labeling for a new animal drug “throughout all stages of its lifecycle”).  
 63. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 268 (“[I]n the absence of . . . any federal 
legislation specifically dedicated to the regulation of genetically engineered products, the 
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agencies to impose labeling restrictions or tracing requirements.64 GM 
products are handled within the 1986 Coordinated Framework designed to 
ensure “safety of foods and food ingredients from new plant varieties.”65 
The FDA is the body responsible for approvals of GM foods66 and looks 
at the final consumer product for its equivalence properties, not the 
process67 of producing the item.68  
In approving GM foods, the FDA looks only at research information 
provided by the applicant and does not conduct its own independent 
research,69 although it does invite public comments.70 Each applicant must 
prepare an extensive briefing packet with a product description, 
consumption and environmental hazard assessment, and claim 
validations.71 For example, the ABT application came in a 180 page packet 
with information required by Industry Guideline 187, under which 
labeling, tracing, or monitoring of GM products is not mandatory.72 Critics 
worry that the FDA neglects the wider impact of the new technology.73 
The FDA uses section 201(g), the new animal provision, of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) for approving GM 
animals.74 This section defines drugs as “articles (other than food) intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other 
 
FDA and the USDA conducted hearings . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 55, at 780–81 (“Since 
the development of GM foods, no federal legislation has been enacted, nor have regulatory 
agencies required any labeling or special approval of these substances in the United 
States.”). 
 64. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 781 (acknowledging that regulatory agencies in the 
United States do not require any labeling or special approval of GM substances). 
 65. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 311. 
 66. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that the FDA makes 
approvals, while the EPA and USDA have oversight duties within the Coordinated 
Framework). 
 67. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 277. 
 68. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 14 (1989) (“[T]he product of the genetic 
modification and selection should be the primary focus for making decisions about the 
environmental introduction of a plant or microorganism and not the process by which the 
products were obtained.”) (original emphasis); Federici, supra note 13, at 537. 
 69. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 312–13; Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 973.  
 70. Bodiguel & Cardwell, supra note 48, at 17. 
 71. See generally REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 
11. 
 72. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17. 
 73. Martin D. Smith et al., Genetically Modified Salmon and Full Impact Assessment, 
330 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2010) (“Although comparing health information for GM and non-GM 
salmon is essential, quantifying risks in this manner implicitly (and implausibly) assumes 
that the new product will simply replace the old one in the market and that the new product 
leads to no changes in aggregate market prices and quantities.”). 
 74. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) 
(2006); POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 44. 
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animals.”75 The FDA justifies its authority to regulate GM animals under 
this statute because, “the rDNA construct in a G[M] animal that is intended 
to affect the structure or function of the body of the G[M] animal, 
regardless of the intended use of products that may be produced by the 
G[M] animal, meets the FFDCA drug definition.”76 In other words, it is 
the rDNA construct and not the whole animal that qualifies as the statutory 
drug. In its 2009 Guidance for Industry, the FDA reiterated its authority 
under the FFDCA and did not mention any other statute referring to GM 
animals. The absence of current federal statutes77 on GM foods led to 
failed FFDCA amendment efforts by members of Congress who proposed 
mandatory labeling of genetically engineered material.78 As of today, 
GM/GM-free labeling in the United States is still voluntary. 
C.  GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Europeans disfavor GM foods and E.U. legislation operates on the 
precautionary assumption that such foods are harmful unless evidence 
indicates to the contrary. This view constitutes an ideological and political 
basis for any trade conflict related to GM foods. 
1.  Consumer (In)Tolerance 
Historically, genetic research and the development of GM foods has 
been the subject of hot debate and vehement resistance in Europe.79 
European consumers have relatively low tolerance for GM foods’ presence 
in their lives,80 and  European public opinion is far more mobilized over 
GM foods than that of the United States.81 Contrary to American 
consumers, European consumers express deep skepticism about the low 
environmental impact of GM foods and exhibit a lack of trust in their 
governments’ food safety regulations.82 Europeans also express more 
skeptical attitudes towards the “human health and safety issues associated 
with GM food products.”83 Although GM food opposition differs from 
 
 75. FFDCA § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 76. REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 6. 
 77. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 51 (explaining that although there is no 
per se federal statute regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and GM foods, the 
practical result is the mix of “the definition of regulatory authority and the agencies’ risk 
assessment of GM products.”). 
 78. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 268, 272; Federici, supra note 13, at 
535–36. 
 79. See Federici, supra note 13, at 516 (declaring that substances have been “hotly 
debated and strongly resisted in Europe”). 
 80. Id.  
 81. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 70, 79. In addition, because GM 
agriculture was not embraced by E.U. farmers from the very beginning, it never became an 
important point for agricultural lobbyists who could fight for GM friendly laws. See id. 
 82. Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 973. 
 83. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 780 (acknowledging that regulatory agencies in the 
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country to country, Europeans are generally skeptical of GM foods, 
perceiving them as not useful and more dangerous.84 
2.  The Precautionary Principle: Unsafe until Proven Otherwise 
The European Union, contrary to the U.S.-endorsed risk-benefit 
equivalence principle, is influenced by the precautionary principle. This 
principle assumes that new technology is not safe until proven so by 
extensive scientific research; thus, the European Union guards its markets 
against the unknown and undesirable effects of GM plants, organisms, and 
foods.85 The E.U. legislature “err[s] on the side of caution, even in the 
absence of any demonstrable risk,” and excludes any potential benefits 
from its analysis.86 A GM applicant must demonstrate the safety and lack 
of harm of each individual product before the European Union will 
consider allowing the products to be marketed within its borders.87 
3.  Stricter E.U. Laws 
Under the Community Framework,88 the E.U. government consent 
bodies impose strict requirements on parties seeking approval of 
genetically modified products.89 Before a modified product can be 
approved, the relevant body looks not only at the research and risk 
assessment information in the petitioner’s application packet, but, unlike 
the U.S. agencies, also requires an independent research assessment by a 
separate designated agency.90 In addition, as a prerequisite for placing a 
 
United States do not require any labeling or special approval of GM substances). 
 84. See Federici, supra note 13, at 542. 
 85. See Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 976. One of the known negative impacts of 
GMOs on the environment is that GM plants, once comingled with natural species, 
undermine the natural plants’ genetic integrity. See id. Due to their increased resilience to 
drought, viruses, and other destructive elements, they tend to completely and irreversibly 
replace the natural species and reduce biodiversity. See id.  
 86. Federici, supra note 13, at 536. 
 87. See, e.g., Zarilli, supra note 1, at 10. 
 88. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 60 (stating that the Community 
Framework is counterpart to the Coordinated Framework in the United States). 
 89. For an overview of E.U. regulation of the GM-matter, see DAMIEN PLAN & GUY 
VAN DEN EEDE, THE E.U. LEGISLATION ON GMOS: AN OVERVIEW (2010), available at   
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/14655/1/reqno_jrc572
23_2010-08-12_eu_gmo_legislation_report_final.pdf%5B1%5D.pdf.  
 90. See id. at 6 (identifying the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as an 
independent body of scientists which conducts the evaluation of potential consequences and 
adverse effects, determines overall risks, and applies management strategies for risks); see 
also REECE WALTERS, ECO CRIME AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 100 (2011) 
(explaining that, in the UK, safety assessments are done by the independent Advisory 
Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP)). A successful petitioner is then 
burdened with periodic monitoring of risks and assessments and subject to a possible 
revocation of approval if risks and dangers are uncovered that were not known at approval. 
See id. These burdensome procedures effectively discourage GM developers from licensing. 
See id.  
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product on the market, the laws require mandatory labeling and 
traceability, post-market monitoring measures, and mandatory public 
disclosure including public registers.91 Furthermore, exports of GM foods 
from the European Union require the recipient’s consent, states must 
implement coexistence measures to avoid unintended presence of GM 
crops, any deliberate release and import into the European Union occurs 
upon strict review, and the producers must clearly label all GM products 
and trace their GM content.92 Under this framework, GM food is approved 
separately by each Member State, and the deliberate release authorization 
is valid for no more than ten years subject to renewal.93  Moreover, the 
“safeguard clause” allows an individual Member State to restrict or 
prohibit GM plants or foods within its territory, provided the restriction is 
based on a “justifiable reason” that an approved product poses a risk to 
human health or the environment.94 Lastly, some E.U. states petitioned for 
an additional “opt-out” provision from all “economic legislation and 
agreements that would require all 27 E.U. countries to trade in GM 
foodstuffs.”95 
D.  INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
While the United States and the European Union operate on such 
diverse principles with regards to GM regulation, they interact in the 
 
 91. See Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 8–9 (permitting each 
member state the use of a “safeguard” to prevent unwanted GM product entry into its 
territory). 
 92. See Regulation 1946/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
July 2003 on Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L 
287) 1, 3–4 (stating that exports of GM foods require the E.U. recipient’s consent); 
Regulation No. 1830/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling [sic] of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, 24 (traceability and 
labeling); Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 5–6 (deliberate release 
and import into the European Union); Council Directive 2000/29, of 8 May 2000 on 
Protective Measures Against the Introduction into the Community of Organisms Harmful to 
Plants or Plant Products and Against Their Spread Within the Community, 2000 O.J. (L 
169) 1, 7 (revealing special authorization measures to avoid unintended presence of GM 
organisms).  
 93. Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 10. 
 94. Id. at 13; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 62; Jonathan Adler, More 
Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International 
Safety Protocol, 35 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 173, 185 (2000). 
 95. WALTERS, supra note 90, at 55 (citation omitted). 
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international trade arena and are subject to international agreements. This 
has led to several trade conflicts that could emerge again if AAS is sold in 
the European Union.   
1.  WTO’s Free Trade Approach to GM Foods 
Although both the United States and the E.U. member states are 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), their approaches to 
GM foods and organisms differ because the European Union has 
additional obligations under the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (CBP), 
wherein the main objective is preservation of biodiversity by limiting GM 
plant and animal presence.96 However, the free-trade-friendly and WTO-
compatible U.S. approach does not aspire to limit movement of GM foods, 
but rather seeks trade-friendly solutions in proscribing rules on how to 
produce, classify, transport, and market them.97 For example, one 
agreement ensures that product requirements and procedures that are used 
to assess compliance with those requirements do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade.98 In spite of its focus on promotion of free trade, the 
WTO framework does permit measures “necessary for the protection of 
the environment and the human health,” provided the measures are not 
arbitrary or discriminatory.99 
2.  CBP’s Pro-Biodiversity Approach 
The United Nations (UN) initiated the CBP,100 which comports with 
the E.U. precautionary principle,101 by tolerating free trade only when no 
threats to biodiversity exist.102 In fact, CBP will only promote international 
trade if transporting of genetically modified matter employs adequate 
biodiversity protections.103 This is achieved by establishing rules and 
procedures for the safe transfer, handling, and use of GM plants and 
 
 96. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CARTAGENA 
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY RATIFICATION LIST 2 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/lists/cpb-ratifications.pdf (listing the European Union as party to the 
CBP, exemplifying their obligation to ensure safe transportation of GE animals to protect 
biodiversity). 
 97. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2, ¶ 1, adopted on Jan. 1, 1980, 
31 U.S.T. 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276 (“[Members] shall likewise ensure that neither technical 
regulations nor standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Perrez, supra note 55, at 267. 
 100. Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 978–79 (stating that the UN-initiated CBP focuses 
on establishing stricter transport, transfer, and handling procedures that will significantly 
limit free movement of GMOs to protect biodiversity existing within the states’ territories). 
 101. See id. at 972. 
 102. See id. at 979. 
 103. See Zarilli, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
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animals, with a specific focus on trans-boundary movements.104 The CBP 
also considers possible risks to human health.105 CBP members have 
access to a web-based information system to assess their GM-related 
risks.106 The E.U. obligations under the CBP require limiting GM-matters’ 
movement across its borders and allow such drastic measures as complete 
prevention of entry onto its territory.107 Panama, where AAS is to be 
grown-out, is a party to the CBP and thus amenable to its obligations.108 
The CBP provides a significant counterbalance to the WTO’s free 
trade rules but does not stand in direct opposition to its provisions.109 
While the United States is not a party to the CBP,110 the CBP provisions 
implicitly impact interpretations of the WTO rules.111 Most of the E.U. 
members (and for purposes of this Note, Panama) have signed and ratified 
agreements protecting biological diversity, while the United States and 
Canada have not signed any of such agreements.112  
3.  The WTO Crop Dispute Stalemate 
The differing principles and approaches of the United States and the 
European Union regarding GM foods, grounded in diverging cultural and 
institutional aspects of risk assessment and management,113 came to light 
in the 2003 seeds crisis. The crisis arose when the European Union failed 
to process approvals for U.S. export of GM seeds into its territory for 
 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 24 (noting the CBP having a specific effect on trade policy). 
 106. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Makane Moïse Mbengue, Trade, 
Environment and Biotechnology: On Coexistence and Coherence, in GENETIC 
ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM, supra note 55, at 
205, 209 (discussing the internet-based information system called “Biosafety Clearing-
House” which enables countries to make informed decisions before agreeing to importation 
of GM matters). 
 107. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 64 (Cartagena Parties are permitted to reject GM 
food); Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 979. In fact, the European Union was a driving force 
behind the CBP and most of its members signed it. 
 108. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 
96, at 3 (listing Panama as party to the CBP).  
 109. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 176. WTO and CBP are not mutually 
exclusive; even though the United States is not a CBP member, WTO panelists can 
implicitly invoke its provisions when solving trade conflicts between the United States and 
the European Union. Id.  
 110. Id. at 155. 
 111. Id. at 176 (“The existence of the Protocol can affect the interpretation of WTO 
legal provision . . . .”). 
 112. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 
96 (revealing that the United States and Canada are not obligated internationally to protect 
biological diversity); see also WALTERS, supra note 90, at 90 (discussing that Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Uruguay and the United States, the so-called ‘Miami Group,’ 
strongly oppose Cartagena environmental protection objectives and see them as harmful to 
trade). 
 113. See POLLACK &  SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
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several years. This allegedly caused massive financial damage to U.S. 
farmers.114 As a result, the United States filed a suit with the WTO for 
violation of international agreements.115 In the document filed with the 
WTO, the United States reserved the right to retaliate against the European 
Union to compensate for the annual value of lost U.S. exports, royalties, 
and licensing fees to the European Union from biotech crops.116 These 
losses resulted from various E.U. member states’ use of the safeguard 
clause117 to block GM crops from their territories.118 The United States 
argued that the resulting ban on GM imports was a violation of global trade 
rules.119 The WTO ultimately decided not to rule on the issue of GM crop 
safety but agreed that the European Union’s undue delay in approvals of 
U.S. GM crop imports caused trade disruption.120 The European Union 
was encouraged to process the approvals, but the WTO ultimately failed 
to rule on the safety of GM crops.121 The United States walked away from 
 
 114. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 183 (declaring that the United States 
could lose $4 billion in exports). 
 115. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the suit took place in 
2003 and alleged that E.U. regulations, which allow member states to block the access of 
GM seeds to their markets, caused a de facto moratorium on E.U. approvals of those 
products). 
 116. Jonathan Lynn, U.S. Seeks to Retaliate against EU in GMO Case, REUTERS (Jan. 
30, 2008, 11:03 AM),  http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL3043174920080130. 
 117. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 63 (explaining that the safeguard 
provision allows individual member states to restrict or suspend GM seeds or GM animals 
from entering into their state). 
 118. EU Wants to Put GMO Dispute to an End, EURACTIV.COM (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/cap/%20EU-wants-GMO-dispute-to-end-news-496059 (“The 
plans would allow large-scale commercial planting in pro-GM countries such as Spain, the 
Netherlands and the Czech Republic, opening up new markets for major biotech companies, 
while at the same time legally endorsing existing GM bans in countries like Italy, Austria 
and Hungary.”). 
 119. U.S., Canada and Argentina Ask for WTO Dispute Settlement over EU's GMO 
Policy, FOOD AND DRINK WEEKLY (Aug. 23, 2003), 
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/business-regulations/629606-1.html  
(“Austria, France, Greece, and Italy, have prohibited the importation and marketing of GM 
products, even though those products have already been approved for sale in the EU.”). 
 120.  See Strauss, supra note 55, at 786. The Panel focused on the delay rather than the 
validity of GM regulations. Id. The European Union itself later made a statement that its 
regulatory provisions are not affected by the WTO judgment. Id. It is another question 
whether the WTO has the authority to impose legislation changes on it members. Id. See 
also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 21 (detailing the judgment of the WTO). 
 121. See, e.g., Ince & Mariani, supra note 55, at 17–18 (noting that the WTO did not 
discuss whether GM foods were safe, whether the European Union had the right to set their 
own standards as to U.S. imports, or whether the approval requirements of the European 
Union violated E.U. obligations under the WTO); see POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, 
at 21 (“[T]he panel avoided determining whether the European Union had based a decision 
on a risk assessment or whether the assessments showed actual risks or greater risks than for 
conventional plant varieties . . . .”); id. at 7 (“[T]he WTO has empowered domestic political 
actors . . .  with an interest in complying with WTO law, and as a result, has encouraged 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to operate more transparently, taking into greater 
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the 2003 seeds crisis with faster processing of its GM crop import 
applications to E.U. member states but no long-term guarantee of a merit-
based ruling in the form of changed E.U. laws that would ease future 
tensions, like those that may arise from AAS imports into the European 
Union.122 While this stark contrast of viewpoints continues to divide the 
United States and the European Union,123 the FDA’s approval of AAS for 
public consumption in the United States would further exacerbate the 
international tensions.124 Salmon is an international commodity and a 
“natural resource of the high seas or common heritage of mankind”125 and 
is governed by special international instruments such as the Convention 
for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, of which the 
United States, Canada, and the European Union are members.126 
E.  U.S.-E.U. SALMON TRADE STATISTICS AND IMPACT ON WILD 
POPULATIONS 
There are two important statistical considerations with regard to AAS 
approval. First, the United States currently exports 23% of its total $536 
million salmon production to the European Union;127 in turn, ABT would 
have difficulty selling AAS in the European Union due to their strict GM-
related regulations. Second, wild salmon move freely in oceanic waters,128 
and if AAS ever escaped or were maliciously or accidentally released into 
the wild, AAS could destroy endangered wild salmon populations.129 
 
account the effects of their actions on third parties.”).  
 122. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 252–53; see also Strauss, supra note 
55, at 804 (stating that the WTO did not rule decisively on any issue significantly affecting 
the suit brought by the United States). 
 123. See generally Ince &  Mariani, supra note 55 (speculating that even the WTO 
dispute resolution entity will not be able to reconcile the two contrasting approaches without 
significant conceptual and philosophical changes).  
 124. See Layton, supra note 3.  
 125. See Wen-Chen Shih, Conflicting Jurisdictions over Disputes Arising from the 
Application of Trade-Regulated Environmental Measures, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 
351, 365 (2009) (inferring that migratory fish need regulation by international tribunals that 
will have the power to implement effective measures of protection and only common 
international efforts can prevent further eradication of endangered fish species). 
 126. KEITH CIALINO, OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
CONCERNING LIVING MARINE RESOURCES OF INTEREST TO NOAA FISHERIES 24 (2010) 
(stating that the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean 
obligates the parties to cooperate in using a precautionary approach to “introductions and 
transfers including aquaculture impacts and possible use of transgenic salmon.”). 
 127. Alaska Sea Food Marketing Institute, Salmon Export Timing - The Big Picture, 
SALMON MKT. BULLETIN, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.alaskaseafood.org/fishingprocessing/0204smb.pdf. 
 128.  See The Atlantic Salmon, N. ATLANTIC SALMON CONSERVATION ORG. (last 
updated Nov. 14, 2011), www.nasco.int/atlanticsalmon.html. 
 129. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 38 (warning that the escaped and 
integrated salmon could eventually eliminate the wild salmon populations and degrade 
larger ecosystems); see also COATES, supra note 6, at 104; Frequently Asked Questions, 
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Research shows that just “60 [GM] fish among 60,000 wild fish would 
bring [a] species [to] extinction within 40 generations.”130 Further, studies 
show that the estimated escape rate of salmon from sea cages [farmed 
salmon] is about 1%.131 While ABT ensures that its production method 
minimizes the risks of escape by using inland tanks, its intent to sell the 
eggs commercially poses far greater risks.132 The Packet does not mention 
who will monitor the independent farmers to ensure that they indeed use 
inland tanks, located far away from reservoirs, as opposed to the far 
cheaper sea cages.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
ABT should not be granted approval at this time because of the FDA’s 
lack of environmental expertise on GM animals, the insufficiency of the 
legal framework, and the possible disruption of the international salmon 
trade. The high impact on international laws, exceptional environmental 
risk, and unparalleled precedential value also preclude such approval. 
Instead, to prepare for future GM animal approvals and to minimize 
chances of WTO involvement, along with precluding environmental 
damage, Congress should enact stricter Coordinated Framework review of 
labeling laws to facilitate GM animal entry into local and foreign export 
markets. 
A.  FDA’S LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTISE ON GM ANIMALS, 
STATUTORY INSUFFICIENCY, AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT LAWS 
Until the FDA has more experience in approving GM animals, AAS 
should be reviewed by environmental protection bodies that specialize in 
the environment. ABT does not guarantee that AAS will not escape,133 but 
 
WILD SALMON CTR. (2004), http://www.wildsalmoncenter.org/about/faq.php (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011) (explaining that farm-bred escapee fish such as salmon or tilapia migrate 
thousands of miles and may  “colonize and crowd out the native wild populations.”). See 
generally Lars P. Hansen & Malcolm L. Windsor, Interactions Between Aquaculture and 
Wild Stocks of Atlantic Salmon and Other Diadromous Fish Species: Science and 
Management, Challenges and Solutions, 63 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1159, 1160 (2006) 
(“Escaped fish disperse quickly from site of release . . . .”).  
 130. COATES, supra note 6, at 104.  
 131. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 54; see also L.P. Hansen 
et al., The Incidence of Escaped Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Salmo salar L., in the Faroese 
Fishery and Estimates of Catches of Wild Salmon, 56 ICES J.  MARINE SCI. 200, 201 (1999) 
(“[L]arge numbers of escaped farmed Atlantic salmon were present in oceanic waters . . . 
.”); id. at 203 (“[In some catches] more than 40% of the fish sampled were estimated to be 
of farmed origin.”). 
 132. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 41 (stating that AAS eggs 
will be produced for “commercial release”); see also Heavey, supra note 4 (“[ABT’s CEO] 
said [ABT] plans to sell the eggs to inland fish farmers.”). 
 133. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131 (“[A]dequate containment 
measures appear to be in place . . . to insure a very low probability of escape for all life 
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claims that AAS are designed to be sterile and will not be able to survive 
and reproduce if they escape into the wild.134 Despite this design 
precaution, up to 5% of AAS are not sterile; this raises environmental 
concerns. Studies on wild salmon migration show their free movement 
within oceanic waters.135 AAS, if released in Panama or Prince Edward 
Island, could pose a serious threat to the already endangered wild salmon 
populations due to its superiority. AAS grow in half the time of wild 
salmon,136 are several times their size, resistant to cold,137 and have a 
greater survival ability than that of wild salmon.138 Thus, ABT’s 
assessment that there are no likely environmental consequences on foreign 
nations and global commons is false, and at minimum, merits independent 
assessment and verification.139 The FDA review system regime140 is 
flawed and insufficient because it does not require independent 
environmental assessment and research. Furthermore, the FDA relies 
exclusively on the data provided by ABT to approve AAS indefinitely.141 
A heavily invested company is the only provider of assessment and reports 
without any re-assessment mechanism. Because of precedential value, the 
FDA’s lack of expertise in assessing the environmental impact of GM 
animals and an absence of independent research precludes federal approval 
at this time. Although AAS’s probability of escape is low, the magnitude 
of impact if an escape occurs is overwhelming, thus making FDA review 
alone insufficient.142  
Further, AAS should not be approved under current law because the 
FFDCA statute may, as some critics point out, be outdated and 
inadequate.143  First, the statute is designed for drug approval, not approval 
 
stages of salmon present.”) (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. at 130 (“[I]t is concluded that the likelihood is extremely small that [AAS] will 
establish and reproduce if they escape . . . .”). 
 135. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 38; see also Jamie Doward, GM Food 
Battle Moves to Fish as Super-Salmon Nears US Approval, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/sep/26/gm-food-battle-salmon. 
 136. See Heavey, supra note 4 (“[ABT’s] salmon has a gene to make it grow twice as 
fast as natural Atlantic salmon.”). 
 137. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65–66, 75. 
 138. AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 34–35 (noting that AAS 
are likely to avoid predation better than wild salmon due to their ability to adjust faster to 
the saline environment and swim faster).  
 139. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131. 
 140. See PLAN & VAN DEN EEDE, supra note 89.  
 141. The E.U. system, on the other hand, grants GM approvals for periods of only ten 
years subject to subsequent extensions.  
 142. See Geiger, supra note 4 (stating that although there is a small risk of escape and 
co-mingling, it should not render the GM salmon safe for human consumption and the 
environment because the small probability of harm is outweighed by the magnitude of 
impact on the environment). 
 143. See TADLOCK COWAN & GEOFFREY S. BECKER, AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES 9 (2010), available at 
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of animals intended for human consumption.144 The plain language of 
section 201(g)(1)(C) refers to drugs by defining them as “articles (other 
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals . . . .”145 Second, the definition within the FFDCA 
statute cannot possibly refer to whole living animals intended for human 
consumption because the plain meaning of the “other than food” provision 
indicates the contrary.146 It appears that the rDNA that AAS contains is a 
“drug” because it is intended to affect the structure or function of AAS by 
causing AAS to grow faster.147 Would the definition apply to a human who 
consumes AAS flesh and the rDNA with it? The Packet does not report 
that the consumption of AAS affects the structure or any function of 
humans.148 Thus, if rDNA is considered a “drug,” does it stop being a drug 
before ingestion by consumers? The statute lacks transparency, introduces 
ambiguity, and has never before been used to approve a GM animal 
intended for human consumption. 
Even if the statute was adequate section 201(v)(2) requires that a new 
animal drug must be determined safe “as a result of investigations.”149 
Opposing consumer and environmental groups point out, however, that 
research is lacking on GM animals to determine safety and warrant their 
large scale production and consumption. Indeed, several U.S. senators 
have criticized the FDA approval process of GM foods for lack of adequate 
review of health and environmental risks150 necessary under the risk-
benefit equivalence principle governing the U.S. approval scheme.151 The 
senators expressed concerns that “[s]uch a limited review of the first GE 
animal for human consumption is wholly inadequate to review potential 
public safety concerns associated and recklessly and needlessly endangers 
 
http://infousa.state.gov/economy/industry/docs/73949.pdf (“Critics . . . [have raised] 
questions about whether the current laws themselves remain adequate to protect human 
health and the environment, particularly as . . . GE applications [have begun to emerge].”). 
 144.  See This Week In FDA History - June 20, 1963, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ThisWeek/ucm117831.htm (last 
updated May 20, 2009) (noting the legislative history of the FFDCA which included the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments that allowed the FDA to more strictly govern the 
“manufacture, effectiveness and promotion of drugs.”). 
 145. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) 
(2006).   
 146. Id.  
 147. See Heavey, supra note 4. 
 148. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131. 
 149. FFDCA § 201, 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(2). 
 150. Christian Nordqvist, Lawmakers Make Move to Stop Genetically Modified Salmon 
Approval, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/202932.php (noting the letter was signed by 
eleven Senators and supported by fifty-two environmental groups, consumer groups, 
retailers, food businesses, and commercial and recreational fisheries associations). 
 151. See generally sources cited supra note 55 (regarding how the United States 
analyzes the risks and benefits for GM food). 
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consumer health.”152  
The recent FDA Guideline for Industry 187 for approval of GM 
animals does not mention any updated or alternative statute under which 
AAS could possibly be approved.  However, it does list groups of animals 
currently being developed to which the ABT product might apply.153 A 
careful reading of animal groups listed in the Guidance could theoretically 
justify regulation of AAS under group (1) “food quality traits,” because 
AAS grows twice as fast as farmed salmon, or group (6) “consumer 
product.” The Packet, however, does not mention these provisions as a 
basis for approval but instead uses the new animal drug statute for AAS 
review.154  
Even if the existing statutes were adequate, Congress must still enact 
full impact assessment laws and impose statutory monitoring and 
traceability requirements modeled on the E.U. framework if the United 
States wants to be an active competitor in the international GM food trade. 
Compatibility with E.U. laws would enable AAS and other GM foods to 
be sold overseas. If ABT was obligated to periodically report to the FDA 
(or some other agency) and label the product appropriately to ensure 
traceability in the AAS derivatives, U.S. and non-U.S. consumers, along 
with interest groups, would likely embrace AAS. A new GM animal-
specific statute would facilitate trade relations and boost consumer 
confidence in both the United States and the European Union.155 
In the meantime, AAS could still be introduced to the national and 
international consumer markets based on ad-hoc event-specific and 
product-specific agreements with the European Union and other nations.156 
 
 152. Thomas Corriher, The F.D.A. is Using a Unique G.M.O. Salmon Approval Process 
to Bypass U.S. Regulations, THE HEALTH WYZE REP. (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://healthwyze.org/index.php/component/content/article/499-the-fda-is-using-a-unique-
gmo-salmon-approval-process-to-bypass-us-regulations.html. 
 153. See REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 4  
(“GE animals currently being developed can be divided into six broad classes based on the 
intended purpose of the genetic modification: (1) to enhance production or food quality traits 
(e.g., pigs with less environmentally deleterious wastes, faster growing fish); (2) to improve 
animal health (e.g., disease resistance); (3) to produce products intended for human 
therapeutic use (e.g., pharmaceutical products or tissues for transplantation; these GE 
animals are sometimes referred to as ‘biopharm’ animals); (4) to enrich or enhance the 
animals’ interactions with humans (e.g., hypo-allergenic pets); (5) to develop animal models 
for human diseases (e.g., pigs as models for cardiovascular diseases); and (6) to produce 
industrial or consumer products (e.g., fibers for multiple uses).”). 
 154. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 1 (acknowledging that the only 
statute the Packet discusses is the “drug” statute). Accordingly, if the FDA concludes that 
its statutory authority is insufficient, it should take proactive steps and issue a guidance 
request to related agencies of Congress. Id.  
 155. Since there are no monitoring or traceability requirements in the United States, this 
could be an initial step to bring the GM framework for approval closer to the E.U. framework 
for approval. Further, because no animal has ever been approved for human consumption, 
this change appears to be appropriate. 
 156. See Thomas Cottier, Genetic Engineering, Trade and Human Rights, in GENETIC 
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Perhaps the biotechnology revolution may no longer be stopped,157 and the 
only reasonable step is to revamp existing laws by adding GM-favorable 
amendments to existing international agreements such as the CBP or to 
initiate a new coalition of pro-GM communities and negotiate with the 
GM-averse communities such as the European Union. 
B.  UNIFICATION OF THE SALMON TRADE TO PREVENT WTO 
INVOLVEMENT AND FACILITATE CBP COMPLIANCE: LABELING 
AAS approval under current laws will perpetuate the history of 
international trade disagreements between the United States and the 
European Union.158 Additionally, AAS approval under the existing legal 
framework will widen the prominent and vast legislative and conceptual 
fissure already apparent in the international arena and visible in the U.S.-
E.U. crop dispute.159 The gap will widen160 because it is reasonable to 
anticipate that the European Union will ban any imports of AAS into its 
territory, thus depriving the United States of a portion of its exports.161 
Reminiscent of the GM crop crisis,162 this could lead to a temporary and 
possibly permanent trade freeze and a stalemate, which could bring about 
another U.S.-E.U., GM-related dispute under the WTO.   
The existing discrepancy is vast because currently in the European 
Union, AAS-type applications would have to undergo independent agency 
assessment such as the one conducted by the European Food Standards 
Agency (EFSA).163 Further, they would need to comply with labeling and 
tracing requirements, post-market monitoring measures, full public 
disclosure, and separate approval by each E.U. state with an active 
 
ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM, supra note 55, at 
17, 47–48 (proposing that biotechnology could be addressed in entirely new international 
agreements).  
 157. See Michael Cardwell, Introduction to THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 1, 2. 
 158. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 276–77 (providing that the United 
States and the European Union have, historically, not agreed on numerous issues relating to 
export-import international trade). For example, when the European Union essentially froze 
approvals on the U.S. soybean and maize seed entry into its territory by imposing strict 
monitoring, approval and traceability requirements, the United States brought a lawsuit with 
the WTO. The United States is in stark contrast to the European Union because U.S. laws 
do not require labeling, segregating or monitoring of the crops. Id.; see also Federici, supra 
note 13, at 516; Cardwell, supra note 157, at 6. 
 159. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 181–82. 
 160. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 780, 807 (providing that U.S. regulations with regard 
to GM produce are much less rigorous as compared to the European Union’s regulation on 
GM produce).  
 161. Alaska Sea Food Marketing Institute, supra note 127, at 1 (stating that the United 
States exports 23% of its salmon to the European Union). 
 162. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 182. 
 163. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 100 (explaining that the EFSA is an independent 
agency that reviews GM applications to ensure food safety consumer protection). 
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“safeguard provision.”164 In contrast, in the United States, the FDA would 
only require a unilateral risk assessment from ABT165 without any 
labeling,166 mandatory monitoring measures, or safeguard withdrawal 
provisions. Furthermore, once the FDA allows it on the market, AAS can 
be sold in each state regardless of the state’s residents’ opinion of GM 
foods.  
While it is unreasonable to expect that the United States and the 
European Union will reconcile their GM-related laws any time soon, one 
viable solution seems to exist which would facilitate GM food and crop 
trade and, possibly, AAS imports into the European Union. A compatible 
labeling system would increase consumer confidence and the flow of 
information and approval transparency. The FDA has already issued 
guidance on voluntary labeling which could be used as a model for 
mandatory labeling laws.167 Moreover, there is growing pressure to impose 
GM-related labeling laws from members of Congress and various public 
organizations. Furthermore, individuals,168 and a majority of Americans 
would prefer labeling.169 
Labeling would also help achieve the WTO’s free trade objectives to 
ensure unobstructed trans-boundary movement of GM plants and 
animals.170 Because all WTO member countries are obligated to regulate, 
produce, classify, transport, and market GM plants and foods in a trade-
friendly way,171 mandatory labeling would necessitate that all recipients of 
AAS operate under the same labeling principle. 
Not pursuing the labeling objective could lead to another WTO 
dispute and likely result in a repeat of the 2006 WTO crop crisis. Would 
the European Union, with its strict laws that would likely prevent AAS 
entry into its territory, be responsible for international trade disruption, or 
would the United States’ lenient GM-related approval laws which 
essentially prevent the European Union from allowing the entry of AAS in 
the first place, be to blame? Regardless of the answer, ambiguity still 
exists. Since the WTO’s authority does not reach so far as to impose 
regulations on its members, it may only recommend actions for conflicted 
 
 164. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (providing that the safeguard 
provision was effectively used by the European Union in the crops crisis). 
 165. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 112–14. 
 166. See generally Strauss, supra note 55, at 780, 784. 
 167. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 317 (stating that the guidance was issued in 2001); 
see also REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS, supra note 11, at 2.  
 168. See Center for Food Safety, supra note 47.  
 169. See ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE: HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY IS 
BEING KEPT OUT OF AFRICA 23 (2008) cited in Federici, supra note 13, at 530 (noting that 
94% of Americans polled prefer that their food be labeled for its GM content). 
 170. See generally Sella-Villa, supra note 13, (discussing labeling as part of a common 
customs classification system that would speed up E.U. GMO imports). 
 171. Id. at 978.  
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parties that are designed to help them resolve their dispute.172 While the 
WTO arbitration body in the GM crop dispute was able to achieve faster 
approvals of U.S. GM crop applications, the European Union retained its 
GM-relevant laws.173 It is reasonable to expect that any AAS-related 
lawsuit would not result in the WTO imposing mandatory approval of 
AAS in Europe. However, proper labeling of AAS, as a precondition of 
FDA approval, could minimize the risk of trade disruption and prevent a 
lawsuit in the first place. In turn, the fate of AAS on the European market 
would be determined by free market principles of customer demand, 
instead of administrative reasons of blocked entry.  
Even the CBP community, of which the United States is not a 
member, would benefit from labeling requirements universally imposed 
on AAS, because Panama could avoid violating its Cartagena obligations 
to “avoid or minimize . . . potential adverse effects”174 of handling GM 
food and animals, when AAS is accepted there for grow-out. Panama, an 
intended home for AAS’s grow-out facility,175 would then likely comply 
with CBP’s requirements of safer transport and handling of GM products 
because each transport batch would presumably be labeled as containing 
GM matter. Without the labeling, it remains an open question whether 
Panama’s acceptance of transgenic eggs would amount to violations of the 
CBP.  
Indeed, the benefits of AAS labeling are significant in facilitating 
international trade under binding international contracts, especially 
because both the WTO and the CBP promote trans-boundary movement 
of articles and products.176 The objectives of both the WTO (free trade) 
and CBP (preservation of biodiversity) would meet on at least this point.  
C.  INSUFFICIENCIES OF THE ABT PACKET AND THE EA PRECLUDE 
APPROVAL 
Even if the FDA possessed environmental expertise and the GM-
relevant statute was adequate, the Packet and the EA still do not merit 
approval of AAS. The Packet, containing 180 pages of reports, 
 
 172. Id. at 974. 
 173. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 786. 
 174. Simonetta Zarilli, Biotechnology in the Energy Sector: Some Implications for 
Developing Countries, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM, supra 
note 1, at 151, 167.  
 175. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 23. The Packet reports that the 
AAS eggs will be produced at the Prince Edward Island, Canada facility, while the fish will 
be grown out in Panama facilities. Id. 
 176. See Sella-Villa, supra note 13, at 978. The WTO and the Protocol are not in direct 
opposition: both the WTO and the Protocol promote trans-boundary movements of articles, 
including GMO products; however, the Protocol imposes heightened safeguards to protect 
biological diversity. The Protocol member countries have thus increased responsibility to 
safeguard health and environment. Id. 
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assessments, and conclusions, does not warrant FDA approval at this time. 
First, although the Packet lists numerous containment measures,177 it does 
not provide a guarantee that AAS is adequately contained to prevent 
escape from ABT facilities.178 Moreover, ABT intends to license AAS 
eggs to third party farmers179 but has not demonstrated any enforcement or 
monitoring measures to control their operations. Second, the Packet does 
not rule out a possibility that AAS is capable of reproduction in the wild.180 
Third, the Packet admits there is no scientific data to preclude AAS’s 
capability of surviving in the wild.181 In addition, although the corporation 
spent sixty million dollars on research, it used only 144 market-sized 
salmon to conduct its assessments.182 Further, the Packet contains only one 
sentence concluding that international consequences are not likely.183 
While the Packet discloses that AAS has been modified with the Chinook 
salmon growth hormone and the ocean pout antifreeze protein, and that 
they contain higher level of allergens, there is no mention of any 
comparable research.184 Instead, ABT concludes that there are no observed 
negative health consequences and that the heightened allergenicity levels 
are not of public concern because consumers already allergic to salmon 
will stay away from AAS as well.185 
Further, the EA does not warrant approval as escapees will have high 
impact on wild salmon if they interbreed. First, salmon are known to alter 
genetically when they change environments.186 Second, AAS would out-
compete wild salmon for food187 since 25% size advantage is enough to 
gain superiority,188 and AAS is several times as large as wild salmon. 
Finally, AAS sterility is not guaranteed—up to 5% may not be sterile.189 
 
 177. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 63. 
 178. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 131 (“[A]dequate containment 
measures appear to be in place . . . to insure a very low probability of escape for all life 
stages of salmon present.”) (emphasis added). 
 179. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 41; Heavey, supra note 
4; Geiger, supra note 4.  
 180. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 130 (“[I]t is concluded that the 
likelihood is extremely small that AquAdvantage Salmon will establish and reproduce if 
they escape . . . .”). 
 181. Id. at 129 (“There are no specific study data addressing [the issue of AAS survival 
in nature] . . . .”). 
 182. Id. at 78–79 (“A total of 144 market-sized . . . Atlantic salmon were included in 
the study . . . . [T]issue samples from a total of 73 salmon were analyzed . . . .”). 
 183. See id. at 131 (“[T]here are no likely consequences . . . on the US, any foreign 
nations not participating in the action, or the global commons [as a result of applicable 
reproductive and geographic/geophysical confinement].”). 
 184. Id. at 65. 
 185. Id. at 75. 
 186. See AQUA BOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES INC., supra note 28, at 21. 
 187. See id. at 35. 
 188. Id. 
 189. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 115 (noting that this could pose a 
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Although survival likelihood is “extremely small,”190 it is still possible. 
This data does not prove that AAS is not a threat to the wild salmon 
population. 
Thus, the conclusions presented in both reports do not qualify AAS 
for FDA approval, even under the more lenient U.S. risk-benefit 
equivalence scheme.191 Although there would be a benefit in faster growth 
presumably lowering the price of salmon, the risks do not outweigh the 
costs. The lack of conclusive research on the health impact of AAS, the 
high allergenicity, and the catastrophic and irreversible environmental 
consequences in case of escape or malicious release, preclude approval by 
the FDA. Yet, this does not mean that AAS could never be approved. The 
FDA should demand research on a larger sample of AAS and more 
conclusive research on the growth hormone consumption impact on 
humans, require placement of emergency measures in case the 
containment measures fail,192 and require a better than 5% sterility ratio. 
The FDA could also set up its own independent research body to evaluate 
the scientific conclusions submitted in the application.193 Further, because 
AAS is a case of first instance, the FDA could require a “disabling” 
mutation to preclude survival in nature.194 In the long run, the FDA should 
issue a formal request to Congress for legislative reform that would 
provide a more detailed framework for future approvals of GM animals in 
general.195 
D.  POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS: PANAMA 
AAS approval by the FDA, in the United States, may indirectly lead 
 
risk of reproduction with the wild salmon if the GM salmon ever became integrated into the 
wild).  
 190. Id. at 130.   
 191. See generally Sella-Villa, supra note 13, (comparing U.S. and E.U. approaches to 
risks regarding GMOs). 
 192. See generally THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 116. Aqua Bounty 
reports that “The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Biotechnology Research 
Advisory Committee . . . has prepared performance standards for safely conducting research 
with genetically modified fish” and that those standards do not “require, or even 
recommend, specific . . . containment measures.” Id. 
 193. EFSA, an independent body in the European Union, works exceptionally well: 
assessment results are comparable against one another, the risk of manipulation by 
applicants becomes minimal and the public has no reason to believe that research is biased 
or otherwise inadequate. See Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) (establishing 
EFSA). The creation of a similar body under the U.S. framework would be a revolutionary 
step. 
 194. See WALTERS, supra note 90, at 11 (noting that science permits injecting genes 
with “disabling mutations [that prevent] grow[ing] outside of the controlled environment of 
a laboratory test tube”). 
 195. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 274 (explaining that recent 
biotechnology events might “call into question the adequacy of the Coordinated Framework 
to deal with new and emerging technologies”). 
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to international law violations by Panama. As ABT plans to produce AAS 
eggs in Canada and grow the fish out in Panama,196 transport between these 
facilities raises international law concerns given Panama’s membership in 
the CBP.197 Given that ABT does not guarantee 100% confinement of the 
AAS,198 any release or escape during transport in Panama’s territory that 
injures or contaminates the biodiversity of another country could involve 
the United States in a potential liability dispute as an indirect cause of 
contamination.199 The United States is not bound by the CBP,200 but ABT’s 
plans to grow AAS in Panama are adverse to Panama’s obligation to 
protect biodiversity within its territory. Thus, in the event that containment 
fails, the FDA approval will have an international impact on natural 
salmon resources in the Atlantic. AAS’s free movement in oceanic waters 
could cause a domino effect in other nations by destroying their already 
dwindling wild salmon populations. 
E.  WILD SALMON PRESERVATION, WILD SALMON TRADE, AND GENERAL 
PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT OF THE APPROVAL 
AAS could eradicate wild salmon populations because ABT’s less 
than 100% effective containment measures combined with AAS’s 
imperfect sterility rate201 could cause AAS integration into wild 
populations202 that move freely within oceanic waters.203 Escaped or 
released AAS could impact both wild salmon trade worldwide and 
environmental preservation efforts that protect wild salmon. Under WTO 
agreements,204  the United States is obligated not to cause unnecessary 
 
 196. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 65. 
 197. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 
96; see also POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 155. 
 198. THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 120–32. 
 199. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 154 (explaining that the United States 
never ratified the CBP and is therefore not bound by its provisions, although it might be 
liable under some other international agreements).  
 200. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 
96. 
 201. See THE ABT BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 17, at 115, 127. 
 202. See id. at 116 (acknowledging that their containment measures are not 100% 
effective and do not preclude either the possibility of salmon escaping from its breeding 
grounds or “survival and possibly establishment” of the fish in the adjacent natural waters). 
Further, ABT reports that “there are no specific study data” addressing the issue of survival 
but that it “conservatively assumed that older life stages . . . would survive if they escaped 
containment in [Prince Edward Island, Canada].” Id. at 129–30.   
 203. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 129; see also COATES, supra note 6, 
at 104 (“[J]ust 60 genetically engineered fish among 60,000 wild fish would bring species 
extinction within 40 generations.”); POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 274; Doward, 
supra note 135. 
 204. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 27 (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/17-tbt.pdf; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
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obstacles to trade, and AAS comingling with wild salmon could effectively 
eradicate non-GM salmon trade altogether, as well as trigger international 
litigation. A dispute over genetic contamination of wild salmon caught and 
internationally traded would likely be brought before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Unit. This would be similar to the 2003 GM seeds case which 
was resolved in favor of the United States.205 However, because the AAS 
dispute would stem from losses to a multitude of fishing industries, it is 
impossible to speculate that the resolution would in any way resemble the 
GM seed case or cause any changes to the E.U. GM-related approval 
system.206 In the crop dispute, the WTO Panel did not rule against the E.U. 
endorsed “precautionary principle,”207 but only focused on undue delays. 
It is reasonable to speculate that a possible AAS dispute would bring 
similarly inconclusive results. It is outside the scope of this Note to discuss 
any possible damage claims that the wronged states and communities 
would then bring. 
In addition, E.U. GM-related laws,208 designed to maintain control 
over which GM organisms enter the environment, would be redundant as 
soon as AAS would become part of the natural ecosystem, and all salmon 
caught in E.U. water territory would have to be presumed GM-tainted. 
Although each European state may independently ban import of GM 
products into its territory,209 countries such as Ireland,210 where wild 
salmon are still fished, would immediately be deprived of their refusal 
right to have GM salmon as part of their diets as the AAS could simply 
migrate into Ireland’s waters.  
Finally, there is no other genetically modified animal that has 
 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/27-trips.pdf; General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.    
 205. See POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 187. 
 206. See id. (explaining that the WTO Panel’s opinion ruled the E.U. delays in GMO 
crop seed approvals as ‘not inconsistent’ with the relevant treaties, criticized E.U. delays in 
approvals rather than the approval system, and did not rule on whether biotech products are 
safe in general or whether the E.U. regulations are adequate).  
 207. See, e.g., Zarilli, supra note 1, at 7 (“For countries like the EU, that have adopted 
a ‘no-risk’ approach, the main preoccupation is to establish strict import measures that 
would guarantee that the chosen high level of health and environmental protection is indeed 
achieved.”). 
 208. See Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 92, (imposing mandatory tracing and 
monitoring requirements for deliberate releases of GMOs and mandatory public information 
disclosures).  
 209. The “safeguard provision” permits restricting or prohibiting a GM organism when 
new or additional scientific knowledge raises concern as to that GMO’s safety for human 
health and environment. Id. at art. 23.  
 210. See European Commission Orders Ireland to Protect Wild Atlantic Salmon, 
FINFACTS (July 3, 2006), 
http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10006443.shtml. 
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previously been approved for public consumption,211 and the FDA’s 
approval of AAS would be a worldwide breakthrough paving the way for 
other corporations to apply for other GM animal-related FDA licensing.212 
The approval would initiate a new era in animal production. The GM plant 
market started slowly but became so prevalent that it achieved a point of 
no return as GM plants are now ubiquitously present and integral to almost 
all agricultural markets.213 Just as the first GM plant was first approved in 
the United States for public consumption in 1996 leading to, in 2004, an 
estimated “global GM crop area [of] 81 million hectares, cultivated by 8.25 
million farmers in 17 countries,”214 the FDA approval of AAS will trigger 
developments that are inestimable and dangerous. While GM proponents 
argue that the FDA had already approved GM animals when it reviewed 
GloFish, the decorative fish,215 this precedent should not be used for 
approving an animal that has an impact on the health of millions and on 
ecosystems across the world.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The revolutionary nature and historic proportions of the FDA AAS 
review is a perfect opportunity for reassessment of the U.S. GM-related 
laws and for considering a possible change to the U.S. GM-related 
legislative regime. The FDA should not approve AAS at this time because 
the approval would exacerbate the historic GM trade conflict between the 
United States and the European Union, interfere with international 
biodiversity agreements, and endanger wild salmon populations.  
Instead, the controversy should trigger new comprehensive 
legislation with respect to GM animal approvals in the United States as 
well as verifiable assessment, monitoring procedures, and labeling 
requirements. In light of prevalent and persistent consumer and 
environmental group protests, the FDA should seek resolutions with 
Congress as the new GM animal or GM food product issue is likely to 
become more prevalent in the future and may emerge in the context of 
international trade relations with other countries. 
 
 211.  See Layton, supra note 3 (“Scientists at the University of Guelph in Ontario, 
Canada, have asked the FDA to approve their ‘Enviropig,’ a hog genetically altered to 
produce environmentally friendly manure. Hematech of Sioux Falls, S.D., is developing 
genetically modified cows that are resistant to mad cow disease.”). 
 212.  Heavey, supra note 4 (noting that ABT itself announced it will seek approval for 
using the same GM technology for trout and tilapia to market the eggs to fish farmers). 
 213. See id. 
 214. Zarilli, supra note 1, at 3. 
 215. See FDA Statement Regarding GloFish, FDA (Dec. 9, 2003),  
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/
GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm161437.htm (explaining that the FDA will not regulate 
the GloFish since they are not used for food and pose no threat to the environment). 
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